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BOOK REVIEW 
Davies, Dr. David (Rapporteur) Seismic Methods for Monitoring Undergound Nuclear Explosions, 
an Assessment of the Status and Outlook, International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research 
(SIPRI) Stockholm, Sweden 130 pp., 1968, $2.50. 
This optimistic assessment of the status and outlook for the use of seismic methods to monitor 
underground nuclear explosions is timely, comprehensive, and competent. It  is valuable for any- 
one interested in monitoring of underground nuclear explosions, whether seismologist or not, and 
gives background as well as current information necessary for adequate understanding of the 
problem. It  is not a scientific treatise, but a consensus with a collection of scientific opinions from 
which the consensus was derived. In general it is clearly written--there is a certain amount of 
confusion introduced because the seismological discussion is primarily carried out in terms of 
magnitude, whereas the consensus tatement only discusses yield. The study group responsible 
for the report consisted of a group of seismologists from Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, 
Japan, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America (Constantinescu, Ericsson, Herrin, Karnik, Mechler, Miyamura, 
Pasechnik, Press, Thirlaway, Whittam, Varghese). Dr. D. Davies, the Rapporteur, was re- 
sponsible for much of the work of compiling the report. 
The conclusions of the consensus of the report are well founded and important (and probably 
conservative) : 
(1) Seismic signals generated by undergound nuclear explosions of magnitude, m, greater than 
4.75 and possibly as low as 4.0, can be identified (as explosions and not as earthquakes) 
as well as detected. The principal criterion for identification is the difference in relative 
excitation of long-period surface waves and short-period body waves. Other criteria 
such as depth, first motion, spectrum, and complexity, although not yet established as 
positive identification criteria, can be used as diagnostic aids. 
(2) The limiting yield above which explosions can be identified by seismic methods (correspond- 
ing to m = 4.75) is about 20 to 60 kilotons for granite (crystalline rocks). Although this 
l imit may be two to ten times greater for materials uch as tuff and dry alluvium, it is 
considered to be unlikely that a sufficient hickness of dry alluvium could be found to 
contain explosions greater than 20 KT. Explosions can, to a limited extent, be hidden by 
reducing signal strength with large underground cavities, but this might be impractical 
for yields greater than about 10 KT. Routine identification of explosions as small as 10 
KT in granite (m = 4.5) can be achieved with better equipment now becoming available, 
and eventually might be possible for explosions as small as 1-3 KT  in granite (m = 4.0). 
As more information becomes available, the assessment for use of seismic methods to monitor 
underground nuclear explosions appears to become more and more optimistic, and may have 
significantly improved even in the short time since the report was prepared. I t  appears that the 
major obstacle to a ban on large underground nuclear tests is political, not scientific. The report 
comes at a time of world-wide concern about nuclear proliferation. An underground nuclear test 
ban is closely related to nuclear proliferation--non-nuclear n tions might be reluctant o sign a 
non-proliferation treaty if the nuclear nations continued their underground weapons testing 
programs. Perhaps the report will help to bring about a ban on underground nuclear tests and 
thus help to slow the world-wide race in weapons development. 
The report lacks an adequate discussion of possible violations of an underground test ban. There 
is a curious naivete or contradiction in the statement beginning the three-paragraph section on 
violations of a treaty: "Although it is outside our scope to examine in detail the motives and 
means of violation, the group did take note of the possibility of violation and considered the 
seismological spects of violation." This is a serious shortcoming since many opponents of a test 
ban hold that it must be assumed that opposing political factions would use all practical means to 
cheat on the ban. The possibility of hiding a nuclear explosion in an earthquake is only lightly 
touched on; it is agreed that on rare occasions, and at considerable risk, this might be done. 
Decoupling with large underground cavities or soft materials is suggested to be impractical for 
large explosions, although effective for small explosions. 
Other limitations of the report stem largely from the circumstances in which it originated. I t  
naturally represents the personal opinions of the limited number of seismolggists involved, and 
many of these opinions can be questioned. However, this does not seriously detract from the 
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consensus tatement. The consensus tatement had to be acceptable to all the scientists in the 
group; scientists with different political backgrounds and different access to pertinent data (they 
were not acting in official capacities). To a certain extent the differences of opinion on particular 
points can be inferred from the main text of the report. Pasechnik (U.S.S.I~.) is consistently more 
optimistic than Herrin and Press (U.S.). The report probably lacks some important data because 
of military classification and may well have expedited eclassification and publication of some 
of these data. At any rate, it does not reflect certain recent research results now publically avail- 
able from the U. S. Air Force Technical Applications Center and the U. S. Advanced Research 
Projects Agency. Consequently, it may have underestimated the importance of depth determina- 
tions, Love wave generation, and better techniques of surface wave analyses. The report does not 
consider ecent observational results indicating that the source dimensions of small earthquakes 
are larger than previously supposed, results which further support the use of surface wave excita- 
tion to identify underground nuclear explosions. 
The report consists of a consensus tatement, a review of seismological principals, chapters on 
(1) detection and location of seismic events, (2) discrimination of earthquakes and explosions 
and (3) conclusions. There are eight appendices on technical matters including decoupling, 
amplitude versus yield, complexity and historical setting. Topics considered also include : seismic 
noise, borehole seismographs, underwater seismographs, eismic arrays, detection probability, 
location of earthquakes, earthquake statistics and international data exchange. 
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